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GOOD CAUSE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
CARRYING GUNS IN PUBLIC 
Joseph Blocher∗ 
Can the government require a person to give reasons before lawful-
ly carrying a gun in public?  If so, what reasons must it accept? 
The answers to these questions remain somewhat unclear, but their 
importance is difficult to overstate.  Licensing requirements for public 
carrying — especially concealed carrying — are central to the regula-
tion of guns in public spaces, which is perhaps the most important is-
sue in contemporary gun law and policy.  As a constitutional matter, 
that issue is the crux of recent cases that have found or assumed a 
right to carry guns in public for self-defense.  As a statutory matter, 
some states have expanded the right to possess and use guns in public 
by liberalizing concealed carry laws, loosening restrictions on gun pos-
session in bars and restaurants, and adopting of Stand Your  
Ground laws.1 
But some jurisdictions — including populous states like California, 
New York, and New Jersey — require applicants for certain kinds of 
public carrying licenses to show cause (such as Maryland’s “good and 
substantial reason”2 or New York’s “special need for self-protection”3) 
for public carrying, especially concealed public carrying.  And the gov-
ernment interest underlying these laws is easy enough to identify, since 
the costs and benefits of gun use are very different in public areas than 
in one’s home.  One can support an individual right to keep and bear 
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for thoughtful comments. 
 1 These and other political and legal successes make it hard to credit the analogy made by 
some commentators between the position of contemporary gun owners and that of black school-
children in the 1950s.  See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 223 (2014) (comparing post-Heller developments in gun rights to the struggle for racial 
equality after Brown v. Board of Education); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Pro-
tect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 230  (2014) (same).  For similar reasons, it seems 
inappropriate to invoke the white segregationist policy of “massive resistance” when describing 
lower courts’ response to District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Compare Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 3, Drake v. Jerejian, No. 13-827 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2014) (describing “lower courts’ 
massive resistance to Heller”), with WIKIPEDIA, Massive Resistance, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massive_resistance, archived at http://perma.cc/MDQ7-586A (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014) (describing the “Massive Resistance” policy undertaken by white segrega-
tionists to oppose school integration). 
 2 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (West 2014) (listing “necessary as a reason-
able precaution against apprehended danger” among these reasons). 
 3 Bando v. Sullivan, 735 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (interpreting the “proper 
cause” requirement of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2013)). 
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arms, and even support the extension of that right into public spaces, 
while still believing that the Second Amendment permits public carry-
ing to constitutionally be regulated more stringently than gun posses-
sion in one’s home. 
Gun rights advocates have recently challenged these good cause re-
quirements on Second Amendment grounds.  If successful, their chal-
lenges could effectively compel states to issue public carrying licenses 
to anyone who is not a felon, mentally ill, or otherwise excluded from 
the scope of Second Amendment coverage.  In gun law lingo, this 
would mean constitutionally mandating a “shall issue” regime for pub-
lic carrying licenses.  It is important, therefore, to understand the ar-
guments both for and against the constitutionality of restrictions on 
public carrying. 
The extreme position holds that any kind of good cause require-
ment is unconstitutional.  As one district court judge put it, “[a] citizen 
may not be required to offer a ‘good and substantial reason’ why he 
should be permitted to exercise his rights.  The right’s existence is all 
the reason he needs.”4  When framed this way, the point is rhetorically 
powerful, but substantively weak.  Surely not every “cause” is “good” 
enough to trigger Second Amendment coverage.  If a person turned in 
a concealed-carry application with the explanation, “I need to carry a 
gun in public so that I can hijack a plane with it,” few would think 
that denying the license would violate his Second Amendment rights.  It 
is not clear why the result would be any different if the insufficient 
cause were conveyed through evidence other than an outright  
declaration. 
It follows that some good cause requirements — or at least some 
“not bad” cause requirements — are constitutional.  Or, to put it an-
other way, the right to keep and bear arms does not encompass a right 
to carry guns in public for any reason whatsoever.  It is equally clear, 
however, that some “causes” for gun ownership are constitutionally 
protected, and therefore cannot be excluded by a good cause require-
ment.  If a person (we can call him Brad) wants a gun because he is in 
immediate danger of being killed by violent criminals — and is not 
himself a felon, mentally ill, or otherwise subject to the categorical re-
strictions approved in District of Columbia v. Heller5 — then his claim 
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to carry a weapon in public would fall squarely within the “core” in-
terest of self-defense.6 
Separating these extreme cases, a host of harder questions remain.  
What if Brad is not actually in any danger, but simply paranoid about 
imagined threats?  What if he wants the gun so that he can hunt 
squirrels, a generally lawful activity whose constitutional coverage is 
nevertheless unclear?  What if his “bad” reason for gun ownership is 
not likely ever to manifest itself in illegal activity? 
One partial answer to these questions is to say that self-defense is 
always a good cause, and that licensing regimes therefore cannot deny 
guns to people seeking to carry them publicly for that purpose.  There 
is much to like in this approach.  Heller, after all, identified self-
defense as the “core” of the right to keep and bear arms.7  And alt-
hough the Court found the need for that right to be “most acute” in the 
home,8 it did not explicitly limit it as such.  In fact, long before Heller, 
courts recognized self-defense and necessity exceptions to gun laws,9 
even for prohibited groups like felons.10 
But this does not necessarily mean that the Second Amendment re-
quires that a person be able to carry a gun in public — let alone a con-
cealed gun — any time he invokes self-defense.  After all, the right of 
self-defense itself typically requires a person to show something like 
good cause — a reasonable fear of imminent harm as a result of un-
lawful force, for example.  In other words, the core of the right to keep 
and bear arms is the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense; the 
core of the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is self-defense.  
And if that core right is compatible with a good cause requirement, 
shouldn’t the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense also be? 
The difficulty of this question arises from the fact that the right to 
self-defense and the right to keep and bear arms for that purpose are 
closely related but not coextensive.  When a person purchases a gun 
for self-defense, he generally does not know whether he will ever have 
to use it for that purpose — fortunately, the vast majority of gun own-
ers never do.  But in light of Heller, the rule cannot be that only those 
people who actually fire a gun in self-defense are validly exercising 
their Second Amendment rights. 
How should the law treat the inevitable space between actions of 
justified self-defense and the preparations for those actions?  Does the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Id. at 630. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 628. 
 9 State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 811–12 (Wis. 2003) (creating exception in concealed carry 
ban for store owner whose store in a high crime neighborhood had been robbed multiple times).  
 10 United States v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that felon convicted for 
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Second Amendment require the government to recognize as “good 
cause” a generalized claim to self-defense in the absence of a specific 
threat?  One way to frame the issue is to ask what level of risk is  
necessary to “trigger” the right to carry a gun in public for purposes of 
self-defense.  A person who is 100% certain to face a justified need for 
armed self-defense would surely have “good cause”; a person who is 
100% certain not to have such a need would not have good cause.  
(The latter person could probably still have a gun at home, and might 
have some kind of cognizable interest in public carrying, but it is hard 
to see how it would be grounded in self-defense.)  When does the risk 
become constitutionally salient?  Ten percent?  One percent? 
Of course, people often have no way of knowing with precision the 
chances of their facing a “real” threat.  Self-defense law and good 
cause requirements approach this uncertainty from two different an-
gles.  Self-defense law is about ex post risk assessment, in the sense 
that the event has already happened, and the law seeks to determine 
whether the self-defender’s actions were reasonable and proportional 
to the threat.  Good cause requirements do the same thing from an ex 
ante perspective, transposing the threat assessment before the action 
takes place. 
To be sure, one might argue that reasonableness, proportionality, 
imminence and other “good cause” elements of self-defense should only 
apply to actions of self-defense, not to preparations for those actions.  
There is some strength to this argument as well.  It is difficult to assess 
a risk ahead of time, which is one reason why well-tailored good cause 
requirements are typically more forgiving than self-defense doctrine.  
Thus a person seeking a license in Maryland need only show that the 
“permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended 
danger,”11 rather than demonstrate the “imminent or immediate danger 
of death or serious bodily harm”12 necessary to justify an action of self-
defense.  It is also true that mere preparations for self-defense might 
never involve physical harm to anyone, so the state’s interest in public 
safety is presumably lower than when it comes to actual confronta-
tions.  Nonetheless, when such preparations include the public carry-
ing of guns, the risk of misuse is undeniable.  It is that risk which good 
cause limitations seek to minimize. 
None of this means that good cause requirements are always con-
stitutional, only that challenges to them should focus on the details of 
their implementation.  If a public-carry licensing regime operates like a 
ban, it should be evaluated as such.  For the most part, though, the 
matter is one for legislatures to decide.  These days, most of them seem 
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 12 State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984). 
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to be moving in the direction of loosened restrictions.  The Constitu-
tion has nothing to say about that trend.  But it also has very little to 
say to those legislatures who have chosen to maintain a “may issue” 
approach to public carrying, including its attendant good cause re-
strictions.  The Second Amendment is busy enough these days without 
being deployed in fights where it does not belong.  
